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COMMENT
THE CRIME OF PROPERTY:
BENNIS V. MICHIGAN AND THE
EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
Eight years ago, Tina Bennis called the police in a frantic attempt to
locate her husband.' John Bennis had not returned from work to the Michigan
couple's residence in Royal Oak, a relatively secure suburb of Detroit.2 The
next day, Ms. Bennis discovered that her husband was in the custody of
Detroit police and became understandably upset when police informed her that
her husband had solicited a prostitute.' She was even more shocked to find
that the couple's 1977 Pontiac had been taken from them, not by joy-riding
kids or a car-theft ring, but by the state of Michigan.' The Detroit Police
Department had her car, intended to sell it, and might give her nothing in the
process.'
Law enforcement agencies employ forfeiture as a tool to solve a myriad
of social problems, ranging from illegal importation of uncertified car engines
to animal abuse to waste disposal.6 Since 1981, government agencies
instituted more than 200,000 forfeiture actions. Furthermore, the federal
government confiscated cash and property valued at an unprecedented $1.9
billion in 1993.8 Due to the lucrative nature of forfeiture, the prevalent
questionable enforcement tactics seriously compromise individual rights.9
1. Debra Saunders, High Court Takes Low Road on Forfeiture, DEr. FREE PRESS, Mar. 13,
1996, at 9A.
2. Id.
3. Margaret Trimer, Police Begin to Seize Cars in Prostitution Crackdown, DET. FREE
PRESS, Oct. 5, 1988, at 6A (quoting Tina Bennis, "I guess I'm glad to know he's alive ..... Wait
until I pick him up,.... I'll talk to him ... and maybe wring his neck.").
4. Id.
5. Id. (quoting a Michigan official comparing the vehicle forfeiture program to the doctrine
of "caveat emptor" -let the buyer beware).
6. See James E. Beaver et al., Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment After Austin, 19
SEAT-rLE U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 nn.51-52 (1995) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 85.1513(c) (1994) (dealing with
the forfeiture of uncertified engines); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.413(5)(e) (West 1993) (dealing with
the forfeiture of waste disposal equipment); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.2(B) (West 1986)
(dealing with the forfeiture of abused animals) and a multitude of other federal and state provi-
sions).
7. Sarah N. Welling & .Medrith Lee Hager, Defining Excessiveness: Applying the Eighth
Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States, 83 Ky. L.J. 835, 837 (1994-95).
8. Terrence G. Reed, On the Importance of Being Civil: Constitutional Limitations on Civil
Forfeiture, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 269 (1994) (citing United States Department of Justice
figures).
9. See id. For example, in 1992, federal, state, and local law enforcement officials raided
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Unfortunately, courts are often powerless to combat such abuse due to the
broad latitude enjoyed by law enforcement entities in pursuing a potential
criminal's property.' °
Traditionally, innocent owners of confiscated property possess ineffective
constitutional ammunition to contest civil forfeitures. Courts grew increasingly
concerned with the plight of innocent property owners, however, as the scope
of civil forfeiture schemes widened. Many forfeitures exceeded traditional
goals of forfeiture," with their intent to punish the property owner, thereby
implicating the Due Process Clause's prohibition against punishment of inno-
cent citizens. In the early 1990's, the Supreme Court took an increasingly
critical approach to this nation's rapidly expanding forfeiture schemes, afford-
ing renewed hope to innocent owners that their property would not be unfairly
confiscated. 2 The Supreme Court reversed this trend, however, in its recent
examination of civil forfeiture in Bennis v. Michigan.3 This Comment ana-
lyzes the Court's decision regarding the forfeiture of Ms. Bennis's car despite
the fact that she committed no crime.
Part I examines the origin of forfeiture and outlines the significant
precedent. Part II summarizes the Bennis decision, paying particular attention
to the critical concurrence authored by Justice Thomas. Part III analyzes the
Bennis decision, arguing that Austin v. United States4 should have controlled
in Bennis because of the punitive nature of Michigan's forfeiture scheme. Part
III then presents varying "excessiveness" tests suggested in the wake of
Austin, concluding that the forfeiture of Tina Bennis's car was
unconstitutionally "excessive." Part IV concludes this Comment by placing the
Bennis decision in contemporary social context. It argues the Supreme Court
the 200 acre California ranch of Donald Scott under the suspicion that Mr. Scott was growing
marijuana. Mr. Scott was shot to death after brandishing a gun to defend his property against the
perceived trespassers. "A district attorney concluded that 'the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to seize and forfeit the ranch for the
government."' Michael Fumento, Hey, That's Mine! Don't Take Property from Innocent Owners,
DE. FREE PRESs, Jan. 30, 1996, at 9A.
10. See Beaver, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing the Scott case, in which the Ventura County
District Attorney's report concluded that no legal impropriety existed as long as the executed
search warrant was supported by probable cause, a relatively easy burden of proof); see Welling &
Hager, supra note 7, at 838 (noting that governments rarely charge the potential claimant with a
crime). "Courts felt unable to control law enforcement agencies, given the permissive language of
the statutes and the presumed inapplicability of most constitutional protections in the civil
context." Id. at 839.
11. See infra notes 27 to 44 and accompanying text.
12. See Robert M. Sondak, The Tide Is Turning: Civil Forfeiture Law Is Becoming More
Accommodating to Innocent Owners and Innocent Mortgagees, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 178
(1994) (predicting that lending institutions will be more likely to receive compensation when
financed property has been confiscated); see, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S.
111 (1993) (extending the statutory innocent owner defense to individuals receiving a gratuitous
transfer of criminal proceeds); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43
(1993) (requiring the government to afford notice and an adversarial hearing to a claimant prior to
the seizure of real property under federal drug statute); Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506
U.S. 80 (1992) (rejecting the government's argument that jurisdiction over confiscated money is
lost once such money is deposited into the U.S. Treasury).
13. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
14. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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Forfeiture is "a divestiture of specific property without compensation
[which] imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid right."' 5
Early cultures demanded that items causing death or injury be forfeited and
destroyed.' 6 "[I]f an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be
stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten."'7 Forfeiture grew from the belief that
an object was "morally affected."' 8 In order to "appease God's wrath,"
proceeds of sale from forfeited property benefitted the poor and needy.' 9
English common law eventually adopted the "guilty property" theory of
forfeiture. ° Deodands were values forfeited to the Crown because an object,
in some manner, caused the death of a citizen.2' England abolished deodands
in 1846.22 Until 1870, English common law also required convicted felons to
surrender all real and personal property."
Civil statutory forfeiture endured. Historically, objects used in violation of
customs or revenue laws were subject to statutory, or in rem forfeiture.24
While America never adopted England's deodand and criminal forfeiture
schemes, civil statutory forfeiture survived the American Revolution. 25 State
admiralty courts after the Revolution continued the colonial practice of in rem
proceedings against vessels or cargo engaged in illegal trade or piracy.' The
"guilty property" fiction circumvented the inefficient process of identifying
owners of ships or cargo that resided overseas."' Similarly, giving the object
a legal identity enabled enforcement of the laws without regard for the actual
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Susanne H. Bales, Note, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment Right to Due
Process--Civil Forfeiture Defendants and Constitutional Protection, 62 TENN. L. REV. 331, 335
(1995).
17. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974) (quoting
Exodus 21:28).
18. Steven V. Miller, So What Rights Does a 1972 HMET Mobile Home Have Anyway? In
Austin v. United States, the Supreme Court Applies the Excessive Fines Clause to In Rem Civil
Forfeitures, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 797, 800 (1994) (citing Parker Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54,
55 (Tenn. 1916)).
19. Id. (citations omitted) (inferring that governments often retained the proceeds despite
philanthropic goals).
20. See Bales, supra note 16, at 335 (citations omitted).
21. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81. "Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, to be
'given to God."' Id. at 681 n.17.
22. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Deodands retreated from view after the emergence of the
wrongful death action. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Miller, supra note 18, at 801 (stating that courts in American colonies often enforced
English statutes through in rem forfeitures).
25. Bales, supra note 16, at 336.
26. Matthew P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem; The Supreme Court's New (and Misguided)
Approach To Civil Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 281, 292 (1994).
27. Id. at 286.
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guilt of the owner. 8 However, the owner was permitted to appear and contest
the proceedings against the property.29
Generally, three types of property are subject to forfeiture: "contraband,"
or property which is legislatively determined to be illegal to own, export, or
import; 3° "instrumentalities," or property used in furtherance of criminal
activity;3' and "proceeds," or the profits of crime.32 Civil forfeiture actions
ask a court to determine ownership of the property in question, rather than
declare its criminal "guilt."33 An in rem proceeding occurs after a statutory
violation designates the property "guilty" and therefore forfeited.34 In simply
finding that a proper forfeiture had already materialized,35 prosecutors avoid
significant procedural hurdles and obtain absolute title to the property in
question."
B. Forfeiture and The Innocent Owner
In the 1800's, the United States Supreme Court addressed two major
admiralty cases which laid the foundation for American civil forfeiture
jurisprudence. The Palmyra,37 decided in 1827, confirmed that a forfeiture
proceeding was against the property itself." In Harmony v. United States,
39
the Court rejected the "innocent owner" defense for in rem proceedings.' By
reasserting the "guilty property" fiction, the Court found that civil forfeiture
was the best method to immediately redress harmful activity and ensure that
property used in furtherance of a crime would not escape the grasp of law en-
forcement.
Innocent owners have since challenged the seizure of their property on
various grounds.4 The Supreme Court expanded its rationale for rejecting the
28. Id.
29. Id. at 285, 303 (discussing how civil forfeiture classification provides prosecutors with
an often decisive edge over their targets).
30. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Contraband "includes items such as adulterated food,
sawed-off shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods." Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1004
(1996) (Stevens, 1. dissenting).
31. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Instrumentalities are tools which a "wrongdoer has used in
the commission of a crime," including such things as guns, cars, boats, and fishing nets. Bennis,
116 S. Ct. at 1004-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Proceeds traditionally encompassed only stolen property
but has been expanded to include certain earnings of illegal transactions. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at
1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Harrington, supra note 26, at 286-87 (explaining that the in rem process is independent
of an in personam suit).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 303 (noting that in rem actions permit a reduced burden of proof, relaxed rules of
evidence, and extinguish the claims of third party lienholders).
37. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
38. Id. at 14 (holding forfeiture of the vessel proper regardless of the piracy convictions of
the crew).
39. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844) (upholding forfeiture of a vessel even though the ship's
captain acted against the orders of the vessel's owner).
40. Id. at 334.
41. See Beaver, supra note 6, at 12; see, e.g., J. W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505 (1921) (holding that the federal tax fraud forfeiture statute in question did not
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innocent owner defense in Van Oster v. Kansas.42 The Van Oster Court held
certain uses of property so undesirable that one relinquishing control of such
property does so at his or her peril.43 Therefore, the law eliminates potential
evasions made possible if collusion between the owner and the user was
required."
Almost a half-century later, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.,4 the Court upheld the forfeiture of a leased boat upon which one
marijuana cigarette was found.' The Calero-Toledo Court addressed whether
an "innocent" lessor could be sanctioned in this manner. In dictum, the
Court suggested that if a property owner proved that he or she was not
involved in the proscribed activity, had no knowledge the user would engage
in such activity, and had taken all reasonable steps to ensure proper use of the
property, such property was not confiscable.'
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Austin v. United States." In Austin,
the state unsuccessfully attempted to confiscate a mobile home and
commercial garage from which an individual sold cocaine.' The Austin Court
conducted an extensive inquiry into the history of forfeitures in American
jurisprudence." The Court found that forfeitures consistently serve a punitive
purpose," explaining that "innocent" owners are punished for their negligent
entrustment of property."
In reaching this conclusion, the Austin Court analyzed the legislative
history of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.54 The Court's
unprecedented holding that the Eighth Amendment applied to both criminal
and civil proceedings" dismayed some observers.56 The Austin Court's
violate the Fifth Amendment as applied to an innocent owner); Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877) (forfeiting leased real estate upon which an illegal distillery was
operated without the knowledge of the lessor).
42. 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (upholding Kansas's seizure of an entrusted vehicle allegedly used
to transport alcohol).
43. Id. at 467. The individual driving the forfeited car was ultimately acquitted of the
Prohibition-era liquor transportation charges. The Van Oster Court recognized this acquittal, but
still denied the innocent owner's claim. Id. at 466.
44. Id. at 467-68. "So here the legislature, to effect a purpose clearly within its power, had
adopted a device consonant with recognized principles and therefore within the limits of due
process." Id. at 468.
45. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
46. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (1974) (suggesting "harsh" law should be
tempered with constitutional protection where the offense appears minor).
47. Id. at 685-87.
48. Id. at 689-90.
49. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
50. Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (holding that the property was not an "instrumentality" of the
offense).
51. Id. at 610-22.
52. Id. at 614-15.
53. Id. at 615.
54. Id. at 608-09. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607-08.
56. See Harrington, supra note 26, at 332-36 (criticizing the Austin Court's "apparent
disregard of the distinction between forfeitures in rem and those in personam").
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revolutionary reading of the Excessive Fines Clause subjected punitive civil
measures to a proportionality review.57
To some, the Austin decision muddied the waters in forfeiture
proceedings." While recognizing a greater historical basis for a
constitutionally grounded innocent owner defense such as was suggested in
Calero-Toledo,"9 the Austin Court refused to endorse a specific test to
determine whether a forfeiture is "excessive."' This refusal left lower courts
uncertain about the scope of governmental forfeiture power.6 Just three years
later, Tina Bennis's misfortune provided the opportunity for the Court to
clarify this scope.
II. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN
A. Facts and Procedural History
On October 3, 1988, Detroit police officers arrested John Bennis for gross
indecency after observing Mr. Bennis engaged in a sexual act with a
prostitute.62 Mr. Bennis committed this offense in the front seat of the 1977
Pontiac that he co-owned with his wife, Tina Bennis.63 After Mr. Bennis's
misdemeanor conviction, the Wayne County prosecutor filed a complaint
alleging that the 1977 Pontiac was a public nuisance subject to abatement.'
Tina Bennis objected to the abatement proceeding, claiming her interest in the
vehicle was not subject to forfeiture because she lacked any knowledge that
her husband would use the vehicle to solicit a prostitute.65 The trial court
rejected Ms. Bennis's claim, declared the Pontiac a public nuisance, and
abated Ms. Bennis's interest in the car.'
57. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622. "We therefore conclude that forfeiture ... constitutes 'payment
to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,' and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause." Id.
58. See Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 851-90 (analyzing the varying excessiveness tests
employed in state and federal courts).
59. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617-18.
60. Id. at 622-23. "Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that question
in the first instance." Id.
61. See Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 844-85 (indicating that different jurisdictions
restrict the Austin decision to certain types of property and utilize many versions of the excessive-
ness test).
62. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich.
1994), aff d, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
63. Id.
64. Id. Abatement of a nuisance is defined as "[tlhe removal, stoppage, prostration, or
destruction of that which causes a nuisance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (6th ed. 1990).
The applicable Michigan statutes provide in relevant part: "[alny building, vehicle, boat, aircraft,
or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or
kept for the use of prostitutes ... is declared a nuisance ... and all ... nuisances shall be
enjoined and abated." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1996). "If the existence
of the nuisance is established in an action as provided in this chapter,, an order of abatement shall
be entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct ... the sale thereof in
the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution . M..." ICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.3825 (West 1996).
65. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
66. Id.
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The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision,67
holding that Ms. Bennis's innocence precluded the abatement of her interest in
the vehicle.' In a 4-3 decision the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's order for abatement.69 The
state supreme court determined that Michigan's failure to provide Ms. Bennis
with an innocent owner defense was without federal constitutional
consequence.7 ° The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari7
and affirmed the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court.72
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The Court framed the issue in this case as whether Michigan's abatement
scheme violated either Tina Bennis's Fourteenth Amendment right of due
process or the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.73 Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that Ms. Bennis could not claim a due process violation based solely on
her alleged lack of involvement in her husband's activity.7" The Court
supported this decision by explaining that Ms. Bennis was afforded both notice
of the abatement and an opportunity to contest such proceeding.75 Relying on
precedent such as The Palmyra and Harmony, the Court outlined the
traditional notion that the offense attaches to the property in question,76
rendering the guilt or innocence of the owner irrelevant.77 Finally, the
majority stated that civil forfeiture is a legal tool too useful and deeply rooted
in American jurisprudence to disturb.78
The Supreme Court stated Ms. Bennis had not made a claim beyond that
expressed by numerous other "innocent" owners to appear before the Court.79
The majority also discounted the innocent owner dicta in Calero-Toledo,
emphasizing that the case's holding supports the majority opinion.'
67. Id.
68. Id. at 486-87.
69. Id. at 486.
70. Id. at 495.
71. Bennis v. Michigan, 115 S. Ct. 2275 (1995).
72. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in
which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined. Id. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg
filed concurring opinions. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer. Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 996. Ms. Bennis's petition for
rehearing was denied on April 22, 1996. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 1560 (1996).
73. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997-98.
74. Id. at 998.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401).
78. Id. at 999.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1676 (1994)
for the proposition that "[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must
attend").
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The Court found the question of whether the proscribed use of the
forfeitable property was its "principal use" immaterial.' However, the Court
reserved the question presented by Justice Stevens regarding whether The
Palmyra and its progeny justify confiscation of "an ocean liner just because
one of its passengers sinned while on board."82
The majority distinguished recent holdings that arguably justify a
culpability requirement in civil forfeitures.83 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that the Austin decision, which held punitive civil forfeitures to be subject to
an Eighth Amendment proportionality review, did not apply to this decision. 4
Specifically, because Michigan's abatement scheme is equitable in nature, the
majority found that its remedial focus precluded any punitive intent. 5
The majority next addressed Ms. Bennis's contention that the abatement
of the 1977 Pontiac was a taking of private property for public use in violation
of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 6 The Court rejected this claim,
arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies the Fifth Amendment
to the states, was not violated 7 because Michigan appropriately acquired the
vehicle through established governmental authority.88
Although the majority recognized the appeal of Ms. Bennis's fairness
argument, it found that Michigan's remedial abatement scheme served
legitimate societal purposes, was supported by historical precedent, and did not
violate Ms. Bennis's constitutional rights. 9
2. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas expressed concern regarding the use of civil forfeiture as
a means to punish those associated with criminal activity.' The Justice noted
that Michigan did not want to prove actual complicity in its abatement
scheme: it wanted instead to punish those directly or even remotely connected
to the criminal activity.9 Justice Thomas recognized the apparent unfairness
in punishing innocent property owners, but felt compelled to agree with the
majority based on the historical acceptance of similar statutes.92 "This case is
81. Id. at 1000 (addressing the question raised by Justice Stevens in his dissent).
82. Id. (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (discounting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), where the Court determined
that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a crime if found not guilty of the charge).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1001. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an analysis of recent Fifth Amendment Takings
jurisprudence, see J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Wind out of the Government's Sails?: Forfeitures
and Just Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 449 (1996).
87. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001. "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
88. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1001-03 (Thomas, J. concurring).
91. Id. at 1001.
92. Id. at 1001-02.
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ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit
everything that is intensely undesirable." '93
Additionally, Justice Thomas questioned what it means to "use" property
in a manner that might subject the property to forfeit.94 Essentially, Justice
Thomas suggested that, in the case of an innocent owner, the criteria for
determining whether property is an instrumentality should be strictly based on
historical standards.95 He n6ted, however, that Ms. Bennis failed to dispute
Michigan's allegation that the 1977 Pontiac was an "instrumentality" of Mr.
Bennis's offense. 96
Justice Thomas also noted that the majority's characterization of
Michigan's abatement scheme as "remedial," '9 avoided the more difficult
issues regarding the punishment of innocent parties.9" He concluded that it is
primarily a duty of federal and state legislatures to prevent the forfeiture of
innocent parties' property.99
3. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg believed the Court's decision rested upon whether Ms.
Bennis had a constitutional right to her share of the abatement proceeds, as
opposesed to a right to the property itself."° Finding no such right, Justice
Ginsburg expressed reluctance to override the Michigan Supreme Court's deci-
sion.'' She concluded that Michigan's forfeiture scheme "deter[s] Johns
from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight,
and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation."'0 2
4. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens recognized the historical prevalence of prostitution and
suggested Michigan's abatement scheme was an "experiment" in curtailing
such practice.'0 3 He believed the majority erroneously relied on unconvincing
precedent, ignored Ms. Bennis's complete innocence, and contradicted the
opinion delivered in Austin.1
4
Justice Stevens focused on the forfeitability of criminal instrumentalities,
or "derivative contraband."'0 5 The Justice determined that the "principal
uses" of the properties in question historically facilitated the offenses
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1002.
95. Id. "[Llimits ... become especially significant when they are the sole restrictions on the
state's ability to take property from those it ... does not even suspect[] of colluding in crime." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (analyzing Michigan's hypothetical appropriation of forfeiture proceeds).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1003.
100. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasizing the equitable nature of Michigan's forfeiture
scheme).
102. Id. (responding to Justice Stevens' dissent).
103. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1004.
105. Id.
1996]
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themselves."° He believed that the 1977 Pontiac was not an instrumentality
in Mr. Bennis's offense, which could have occurred practically anywhere. 7
Justice Stevens's dissent also questioned the Court's characterization of
the Michigan forfeiture scheme as remedial.'" Justice Stevens argued that
Mr. Bennis would not necessarily be deterred by the abatement, which
suggested a punitive-not remedial-motivation for the forfeiture." 9 The
Justice contended the Court's opinion in Austin ciearly indicated the punitive
.nature of civil forfeitures." 0
Furthermore, Justice Stevens concluded, basic notions of fairness prohibit
the punishment of innocent people.' He proposed that civil forfeitures rest
"at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his
property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that
negligence."" 2 Justice Stevens urged that culpability is a basic requirement
of due process." 3
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for contradicting the Austin
decision."' The Justice characterized the forfeiture as a violation of the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause."5 While refusing to set forth a
specific test for permissible forfeiture of an innocent person's property, he
believed that this case was clearly unconstitutional." 6
5. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
While Justice Kennedy recognized the legitimate purposes that in rem
forfeiture serves in admiralty," 7 he found no such legitimate purpose served
in Ms. Bennis's case.' He asserted that the integrity of The Palmyra line of
cases could be upheld by distinguishing vessels engaged in an unlawful
voyage from automobiles tangentially used in crime. " '
Additionally, Justice Kennedy did not believe the Court eliminated a
culpability requirement in all instances.'2" Justice Kennedy acknowledged
106. Id. at 1005-06 (arguing that prior vehicle forfeiture statutes presented to the Court which
prohibited conduct directly related to the vehicle's locomotive capacity, differed from this case, in
which the Bennis vehicle's power of locomotion was irrelevant).
107. Id. at 1006.
108. Id. at 1006-07.
109. Id. (emphasizing Michigan's apparent admission that the forfeiture was designed to pun-
ish Mr. Bennis and noting that Mr. Bennis allegedly solicited prostitutes in the same area prior to
his arrest without a vehicle, and could easily repeat such behavior).
110. Id. at 1006-07.
111. Id. at 1007 (emphasizing Ms. Bennis' complete lack of involvement in any offense).
112. Id. (quoting Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808).
113. Id. at 1008.
114. Id. at 1010.
115. Id. (concluding that the punitive nature of the Michigan abatement scheme and Ms.
Bennis's innocence warranted such a characterization).
116. Id.
117. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1011.
119. Id. at 1010-11.
120. Id. at 1011.
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that regardless of the value of Ms. Bennis's ownership interest in the vehicle,
such interest should be protected. 2'
III. ANALYSIS
The Bennis majority denied Ms. Bennis's constitutional claim by
overemphasizing the "guilty property" fiction and then rationalized its holding
by incorrectly characterizing Michigan's abatement scheme as solely remedial.
The Bennis dissenters appropriately declared the forfeiture a violation of
constitutional due process, but reduced their effectiveness by misdirecting their
arguments.
The following Section argues that due to, the punitive nature of
Michigan's abatement scheme, the Austin decision should have controlled the
Bennis holding. The Analysis then discusses whether Ms. Bennis could have
prevailed under the excessiveness review required by Austin.
A. Punitive Nature of Michigan's Abatement Scheme
A punitive statute is one "which creates forfeiture or imposes
penalty."'22 While the guilty property notion coexists with the knowledge
that "[iut is the owner who feels the pain and receives the stigma of the for-
feiture, not the property,"' 23 the Bennis Court engaged in semantics to render
a decision based on the ancient legal fiction. The Austin decision severely
criticized the guilty property fiction, generally declaring civil forfeiture to be
punitive in nature.'24 The current Court, however, continues to mold the legal
meaning of "punishment" to achieve its desired goals. l" One must wonder
whether the Framers of our Constitution similarly understood unjust gov-
ernmental action.'26 Regardless, the Supreme Court certainly contradicted
basic understandings of punishment when it declared Michigan's forfeiture
statutes to be non-punitive in nature.
Michigan admitted that the confiscation and eventual forfeiture of the
Bennis's vehicle served to effectively punish Mr. Bennis for his illicit
121. Id.
122. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
123. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2151 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124. Austin, 509 U.S. at 614-15.
125. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Decided just 15 weeks after Bennis, Ursery
addressed the same civil forfeiture statute declared punitive in Austin. The defendant challenged
his criminal prosecution based on double jeopardy grounds because the government had
previously instituted a "punitive" civil forfeiture action against the defendant's home. The Court
distinguished its prior discussions of punishment in Halper and Austin, restricting Austin solely to
an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines analysis and Halper to civil penalty cases under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 2145, 2147. "Forfeitures ... are subject to review for
excessiveness ... after Austin; this does not mean, however, that those forfeitures ... constitute
punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy." Id. at 2147.
126. At oral argument in Ursery, Justice Scalia asked, "I can't understand why somebody
who would write a Constitution would think that a punishment is a punishment for one purpose
but not another. I mean, if it's punishment enough that you can't make it excessive, why isn't it
punishment enough that you shouldn't get it twice?" United States Supreme Court Official Tran-
script at 7, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (No. 95-345, 346).
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behavior.'2 7  The statutes which facilitated the abatement were thus
concededly punitive in nature. 2 The statutes subsequently penalized Ms.
Bennis through the complete forfeiture of a car which she co-owned. The
majority argued that the deterrent aspect of the statute merely reinforces the
remedial effect." 9
Justice Thomas's. concurring opinion illustrates the majority's confusion
over whether a forfeiture scheme is punitive. The Justice recognized "[tihe
State ... says that it wants to punish ... persons who ... may at least have
negligently entrusted their property.""'3 Similarly, the Justice noted such
"punishment" might violate notions of fairness. 3' He then, inexplicably,
followed this apparent admission with a lengthy discussion of why Michigan's
abatement scheme was solely remedial.'32
Next, Justice Thomas cited the Michigan trial court's conclusion that Ms.
Bennis should not be compensated because the proceeds of the vehicle's sale
would not exceed, "by much," the attributable costs.'33 Justice Thomas
inferred that if Michigan retained any portion of the proceeds after all "costs"
had been satisfied, the abatement scheme's remedial nature would probably
not be altered.'34 In fact, if Michigan actually retained any amount of the
proceeds for non-compensatory reasons, the state action was punitive in na-
ture. 
13
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg's conclusion that Michigan's abatement
scheme deters "Johns"' 36 paralleled the Chief Justice's emphasis of the
127. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the plaintiff-appellant's brief).
128. Id. at 1000.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1001
131. Id..
132. Id. at 1002.
133. Id.
134. Id. In finding that issues regarding punishment of innocent persons do not arise in this
case, Justice Thomas wrote:
[tlhis is most obviously true if, in stating that there would be little left over after 'costs,'
the trial judge was referring to the costs of sale. [E]ven if the 'costs' that the trial judge
believed would consume most of the sales proceeds included not simply the expected
costs of sale, but also the State's costs of keeping the car and law enforcement costs
related to this particular proceeding, the State would still have a plausible argument that
using the sales proceeds to pay such costs was 'remedial' action.
Id. at 1002 n.*. Justice Thomas still failed to address the vital question inherent in his argument;
What, if any, portion of the proceeds remained after Michigan satisfied all appropriate costs? See
infra text accompanying note 133.
135. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
"However the theory may be expressed, it seems to me that this taking of lawful property must be
considered, in whole or in part, punitive. Its purpose is not compensatory, to make someone whole
for injury caused by unlawful use of the property." Id. (citations omitted). The Ursery Court
criticized this approach in determining whether a statute was punitive in nature for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. The Court argued that the second stage of an
Excessive Fines evaluation should determine whether the forfeiture was disproportionate either to
the offense or to the costs incurred by the government as a result of the offense. To make such an
evaluation in the first instance would be repetitive. The Ursery Court did not, however, offer
guidance as to an appropriate method to determine "punishment" within an Excessive Fines
context. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
136. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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abatement statute's "deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose."'37
As Justice Stevens pointed out, these statements are puzzling in light of United
States v. Halper,35 in which the Court found deterrence itself to be an aim
of punishment.'39
Justice Ginsburg's allegiance apparently shifted during this case,"4 while
Justice Thomas reluctantly accepted the majority's conclusions. 4' In so
doing, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas lost the chance to cast the decisive votes
in this case and, thereby, uphold due process. Somehow, Justice Thomas ulti-
mately found that "the more severe problems involved in punishing someone
not found to have engaged in wrongdoing of any kind [did] not arise."'
' 42
The Austin Court rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings, 43 and
too ambitiously pronounced that all civil forfeitures serve at least partially to
punish the property owner.'" Instead of narrowing the Austin Court's
declarations to apply only to instrumentalities of crime,15 the Court in one
broad stroke eliminated the only protection left to the innocent owner of "of-
fending" property.
Certain property poses a direct threat to the physical and economic
security of society and its members."4 Confiscation of dangerous property,
ensures the safety and stability which is essential to a civilized society.4 7
Under the American system, therefore, civil forfeiture statutes removing con-
traband and proceeds from circulation remedy a situation equally dangerous to
137. Id. at 1000.
138. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
139. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment . ' d. The Ursery Court, also addressing a double jeopardy claim,
cited Bennis as support for the distinct, non-punitive purpose deterrence serves in civil forfeitures.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149. Justice Stevens uncovered another significant flaw in the majority
opinion. The majority compared the effect of Michigan's forfeiture statute on Ms. Bennis to her
potential liability had Mr. Bennis negligently injured an individual while driving. Bennis, 116 S.
Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This analogy is rendered moot by the Court's decision in
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), in which it was determined
that the Excessive Fines Clause is confined to measures payable to the government, not private
individuals. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260.
140. David G. Savage, Innocence Punished, 82 A.B.A. J. 47, 48 (1996) (noting Justice
Ginsburg's apparently sympathetic position during oral argument).
141. Id. (noting Justice Thomas' recognition of injustice and inability to prevent the harm
inflicted upon Ms. Bennis).
142. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002.
143. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
144. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
145. See Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeitures After
Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235, 245-
50 (1994) (concluding that "[elven without relying on [the guilty property] fiction, the forfeiture
of [proceeds] serves the government's remedial interest in removing contraband from public
circulation").
146. See Harrington, supra note 26, at 348-50 (supporting the "guilty property" fiction for its
usefulness in immediately redressing potentially harmful situations).
147. See id. "Admittedly, even this type of seizure has always seemed to be at least a
technical violation of the Due Process Clause, but courts have countenanced such violations on the
grounds that public health concerns outweigh individual rights in exigent circumstances." Id. at
349.
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each member of society, including the criminal offender."4 Forfeiture of
such property returns society to the state which existed had no crime been
committed in the first instance-a constitutionally supportable goal of forfei-
ture. 49 However, confiscation of lawful property used in crime punishes the
property owner by eliminating the property's future legal use as well as any
potential unlawful use. °
Michigan diligently emphasized the remedial aspects of its forfeiture
scheme. 5' The state arguably improved the health and safety of its citizens
by seizing a vehicle supposedly contributing to "urban blight" and a weakened
local community.'52 The Supreme Court of Michigan also noted that had Mr.
Bennis picked up the prostitute and driven to a less notorious part of Detroit,
the vehicle would not have been subject to forfeit.'53 While Justice Stevens
condemned this result, it best demonstrates Michigan's effort to remedy the
"red light" community's prostitution problem.'54 Intense criticism of valid
remedial results undermined the dissent's credibility and diverted the Court's
attention away from the forfeiture's plainly punitive purposes."'
Tina Bennis contributed to the purchase of the vehicle in which Mr.
Bennis lawfully commuted to work.'56 Common sense dictates that the
deprivation of Ms. Bennis's interest in the vehicle punished Ms. Bennis for an
148. Id. at 348-50. Punishment, in any recognizable sense, is not inflicted when an individual
forfeits property which one never legally owned. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (6th ed.
1990) (defining ownership as the "entirety of the powers of use and disposal allowed by law").
149. See Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 311, 330-32 (1994) (challenging the "guilty property" fiction based on an individual rights-
based argument). Pilon states:
[Liegitimate or justified remedies are forfeitures: to require a wrongdoer to restore the
status quo by returning what his action has taken is to require him to 'forfeit' those
holdings that are necessary to that end. [F]orfeitures can reach no further than the wrong
they are intended to remedy... [or] they become excessive.
Id. at 330-31.
150. See Reinhart, supra note 145, at 248-50 (arguing that Justice Scalia's "substantial
connection" test should be used when determining whether a forfeiture of facilitating property was
excessive). Under this theory, governments could still immediately confiscate alleged
instrumentalities, and, in many cases, retain the entire proceeds of sale to satisfy their costs.
Innocent owners would be compensated, however, and governments would simply be required to
account for their costs. This Comment argues that any additional "accountability" costs involved
in an excessiveness review are outweighed by the greater interest in protecting citizens from
unjust punishment.
151. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
152. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
153. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 491 n.22 (Mich.
1994), aff d, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
154. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Michigan's
forfeiture scheme creates a potentially disturbing socioeconomic disparity. Criminals apprehended
in less desirable portions of Detroit appear absolutely liable to suffer remedial forfeitures of their
property. However, equally offensive criminals discovered in better maintained communities will
never incur forfeiture costs. See id.
155. See id. at 1007 (arguing that Mr. Bennis's ability to repeat this behavior without a car
indicates the punitive nature of the forfeiture). While the absence of any deterrent value with
regard to Ms. Bennis strengthens the argument that she was punished by the forfeiture, the
argument weakens when applied to Mr. Bennis. Michigan has certainly ensured Mr. Bennis will
never commit another offense in the forfeited vehicle. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 1008 (suggesting Tina Bennis "is just as blameless as if a thief, rather than her
husband, had used the car in a criminal episode").
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ultimately unwise "investment." 5  While common sense certainly does not
control the action of our nation's highest Court, the Bennis majority reached a
result blatantly contrary to its reasoning.' The Court should have held that
Michigan's forfeiture statute served remedial as well as punitive goals.'59
Finally, Michigan admitted that a few "individuals may be ... harmed by
application of state law under its police powers."'" Austin clearly erected a
constitutional barrier, however, when such harm results from a punitive civil
forfeiture. The Austin Court chose to construct an overreaching theory of civil
forfeiture in a case specifically addressing the confiscation of alleged
instrumentalities of crime. The Bennis Court should have held that a civil
forfeiture of facilitating property that serves legitimate societal purposes is, at
least partially, punitive in nature. By so doing, the Court would have honored
the Austin Court's extensive inquiry into forfeiture jurisprudence but
appropriately limited the Austin holding. A correct evaluation would have
therefore required the Court to determine whether Ms. Bennis's punishment
was constitutionally "excessive."
B. Excessiveness
Ms. Bennis argued to the Court that a property owner should possess a
threshold culpability in forfeiture proceedings. 6' This was a weak argument,
however,'62 because many forfeitures serve solely remedial purposes and do
not warrant an excessiveness evaluation.'63 In Austin, the court considered
potential excessiveness tests and their relative effectiveness regarding innocent
owners.'64  While lower courts have lacked consistency in such
evaluations,'65  the Supreme Court could have provided guidance in
excessiveness reviews.
1. Proportionality Approach
For example, the Court could have employed a "proportionality" test in
measuring excessiveness. This test measures the severity of the underlying
157. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (arguing that the justifications for strict liability in other
settings are inapplicable in this instance). "There is no reason to think that the threat of forfeiture
will deter an individual from buying a car with her husband-or from marrying him in the first
place ... [therefore,] [t]he absence of any deterrent value reinforces the punitive nature of this
forfeiture law." Id. at 123-47.
158. See supra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
159. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 (holding a civil penalty may constitute punishment under
the Double Jeopardy Clause). "[C]ivil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial
goals." Id. at 447.
160. Brief for Respondent at 29, Bennis (No. 94-8729).
161. Brief for Petitioner at 13-31, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
162. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bennis (No. 94-8729) (relying heavily on the innocent
owner dicta in Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90).
163. Austin, 509 U.S. at 614.
164. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 53, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct.
994 (1996) (No. 94-8729) (accepting oral argument regarding innocent owners and the potentially
applicable culpability standards of "negligent entrustment" and "reasonable steps").
165. See supra note 60.
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offense against the harshness of the forfeiture imposed."6 A property owner
must have engaged in blameworthy conduct.'67 Under this test, Ms. Bennis
suggested the Court apply a "negligent entrustment" standard for owners
claiming innocence."6 Ms. Bennis entrusted the 1977 Pontiac to Mr. Bennis
at the time of purchase, effectively establishing in Mr. Bennis an undeniable
right of control over the vehicle. The negligent entrustment standard is satis-
fied if, upon entrustment, Ms. Bennis neither knew nor had reason to know
Mr. Bennis would use the vehicle illegally.
In contrast, the United States, through an amicus brief to the Court, advo-
cated adoption of the "reasonable steps" test originally suggested in Calero-
Toledo. 69 The "reasonable steps" test would require a greater effort on the
part of co-owners of property to prevent illegal use of the property by extend-
ing reasonable care beyond initial entrustment.' 0 Under this test, if Ms.
Bennis became aware of Mr. Bennis's illegal activity at any time prior to his
arrest, she would have been required to act reasonably to prevent future illegal
uses.
The Court, under either proposed proportionality test, would have
certainly recognized Ms. Bennis's innocence and declared the forfeiture
unconstitutionally excessive. Additionally, Michigan even conceded Ms.
Bennis was wholly innocent in Mr. Bennis's offense. 7'
2. The Austin Instrumentality Approach: A Better Fit
Justice Scalia proposed a more historically sound approach to determine
excessiveness.'72 The Justice's concurring opinion in Austin gave birth to
what is commonly referred to as the "instrumentality" or "substantial connec-
tion" test.' This test suggests that courts compare the relationship between
the property in question and the offense which gave rise to the forfeiture
proceeding.'74 The substantial connection test purportedly ignores the value
of the property in question and the culpability of the owner.' The relevant
question becomes whether the property was used closely enough in the offense
to be appropriately deemed "guilty," and therefore forfeitable.
At first glance, the Bennis vehicle would seem to be a vital element in
Mr. Bennis offense, and properly subject to forfeiture. However, as Justice
166. See Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 865.
167. Id.
168. Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, Bennis (No. 94-8729).
169. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 53, Bennis (No. 94-8729).
170. Id.
171. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
172. Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 856.
173. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 623-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
174. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
175. See id. "Scales used to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example are confiscable
whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal." Id. at 627. Justice Stevens pointed out that
in Austin, however, the Court held that dramatic variations in the value of forfeitable property
under a statutory scheme undercut the argument that such forfeitures serve remedial purposes.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens argued, the vehicle was not an instrumentality of Mr. Bennis's offense
because it was stationary-the offense could have taken place practically
anywhere. 7 6 Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin lends even more support
to Justice Stevens's observation."7 Recognizing that the guilty property fic-
tion cannot extend indefinitely, the Austin Court unanimously agreed that the
garage in which a single drug sale took place could not be considered an
instrumentality of the relevant offense. 7 s Under this rationale, the Bennis
Court would have concluded that simply because the Bennis's vehicle housed
a single illicit transaction, the vehicle's "culpable" connection to the offense
was inconsequential.
3. Combination Approach
Ms. Bennis could have satisfied Justice Scalia's instrumentality test in
another manner. The common law notion of deodand justified the forfeiture of
only the value of property which caused the death of a citizen.'79 Therefore,
if a cart ran over and killed an individual, the value of the entire cart was for-
feitable to the King. If the driver fell from the cart and was killed by the
wheel, however, the sovereign could only confiscate the value of the "guilty"
wheel.' Similarly, in admiralty a forfeiture was limited to the offending
vessel or cargo."'8
Therefore, the Court should have separately identified Ms. Bennis's
interest in the vehicle and concluded that her interest bore no "substantial
connection" to the offense committed by Mr. Bennis. 2 Mr. Bennis's
undeniable right to control the illicit use of the vehicle is analogous to the
"guilty" wheel or offending cargo in Justice Scalia's traditional forfeiture
approach. Inseparable from the "offending" portion of the property, Ms.
Bennis's interest should have been spared. While Justice Scalia did not include
a culpability requirement in the instrumentality test, the Court could have
fashioned Justice Scalia's instrumentality test to include a proportionality
review.
Thus, the Court would have found in Ms. Bennis's favor under either the
proportionality, instrumentality, or this Comment's "combination" approach
had the Justices appropriately reached such a juncture.
176. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
177. id.
178. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 621.
179. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
180. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 690 n.27. "Our ancestors seem fully to have perceived
the hardship of inflicting such penalty on one who had been guilty of no moral or indeed legal
offense; and in all cases, therefore . . . found that only to be the deodand which by its immediate
contact occasioned death." Id.
181. See Reed, supra note 8, at 258.
182. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that civil forfeiture is a result of the merger of the deodand tradition and
the belief that wrongdoers could be denied their property).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Bennis court ignored Austin in favor of an outdated doc-
trine that is constitutionally unsound when applied to innocent owners of crim-
inal instrumentalities. Tina Bennis, probably as innocent an owner as had ever
come before the Court, was the victim of flawed legal reasoning. The Bennis
court needlessly infringed upon basic constitutional guarantees by engaging in
semantics.
We may never know what persuaded the Court to revitalize the antiquated
"guilty property" fiction. Perhaps the Court was concerned that its recent
holdings "blurred" traditional notions of civil forfeiture.'83 If so, the Bennis
decision did not quiet critics' voices.'84 Bennis may force the banking indus-
try to refrain from lending to "high risk" borrowers potentially "inclined" to
commit criminal acts."5 Third-party lienholders may be forced to seek
legislative protection whenever a forfeiture scheme is presented. 6 Property
owners may be prosecuted for innocent entrustment. However, since many
forfeiture statutes currently include innocent owner protection, Bennis may
have a minimal practical effect on law enforcement.'87
The endurance of civil forfeiture appears certain. The Supreme Court,
however, must identify the constitutional limits of governmental seizures. The
Court now invites punishment of innocent owners but vaguely protects the
property rights of convicted criminals. Americans' only hope is that their
legislators refuse the Court's invitation. Civil forfeiture has proven somewhat
successful in the "war on drugs," and the resulting litigation provides the
Court with unique opportunities to clarify a difficult field of law. In each case,
the Court must assess the delicate balance between government power and
individual rights. In upholding the Constitution, the Court should have found
an innocent owner exception for Tina Bennis within the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause. Unfortunately, a misguided adherence to "tradition"
veiled such exception from the current Court's view.
R. Todd Ingram*
183. See Harrington, supra note 26, at 318.
184. See Stephen Chapman, Almost Blind Justice: Sometimes Even the Innocent Are Guilty,
CHm. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1996, at 27; OvermuchlOverzealous Forfeiture Law Overdue for an Overhaul,
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185. See Steven L. Kessler, Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner, 214 N.Y. L.J. 101 (1995).
186. Id.
187. See Savage, supra note 140, at 48.
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